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Gjalt de Graaf and job van exel
abstract
Q methodology is seldom used by academics and practitioners in the field of ad-
ministrative ethics, but it has important potential for empirical studies. Q offers a 
procedure and conceptual framework with which to study subjectivity in the social 
context. It has the advantage of bringing marginalized viewpoints to the fore but also 
has some drawbacks. The appendix provides a basic introduction to Q and shows 
how it can be used in research.
Administrative ethics uses a wide range of methodologies (Menzel 2005); many 
purely descriptive studies are either quantitative and use surveys, or qualitative 
and use case-studies. Q methodology, an approach for the study of subjectivity, is 
rarely used in academic research or organizational and policy practice related to 
administrative ethics. 
Although not yet accepted in the field of administrative ethics, Q methodology 
is widely employed in other administrative sciences. As one example of its use, van 
Eeten’s (2001) study of the Schiphol Airport expansion controversy in the Neth-
erlands won best article of the year in the Journal of Policy Analysis and Manage-
ment. He writes: “The 1999 mini-symposium in the Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management shows that Q-methodology is finally being considered a candidate for 
the toolkit of mainstream policy analysis. The discussion seems to shift from funda-
mentalist debates over epistemology toward the question of the added value to the 
analysts’ toolkit” (2001, 396). Q methodology has also been applied more widely 
than policy analysis in public administration. Prominent examples of researchers 
who have adopted it include Selden, Brewer, and Brudney (1999), who identified 
five conceptions of administrative roles and responsibilities; Gaines, van Tubergen, 
and Paiva (1984), who studied the perceptions of police officers about promotion 
as a source of motivation; and Cunningham and Olshfski (1986), who did a Q on 
opinions and perceptions of the administrator-legislator relationship.
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Rarely, however, is Q methodology employed in the field of administrative ethics. 
Close to the field of administrative ethics, although not selected in Menzel’s (2005) 
overview, is the study by Brewer, Selden, and Facer (2000), which  used the technique 
on individual conceptions of public service motivation. Earlier, Hiruy (1987) wrote 
a Ph.D. thesis on the ethical orientation of public administrators. The respondents, 
with the help of Q, reflected on ethical theories 
that emphasized personal, situational, social, and 
existential ethics.
Why aren’t there more such studies in admin-
istrative ethics? And what exactly is the added 
value of Q for administrative ethics? The discus-
sion in this article explores some of the weaker points of the methodologies that 
today dominate administrative ethics, a field also sometimes termed “public service 
ethics” (Lawton and Doig 2006) and “ethics and integrity of governance” (Menzel 
2005). It then considers whether Q can help administrative ethics with respect to the 
weaknesses of current methodologies and also treats the possibilities of combining 
Q with discourse theory. 
Qualitative and Quantitative Studies in Administrative Ethics
Context is of the utmost importance for much of the research in administrative ethics. 
Values get their meaning only within the context in which they are used (de Graaf 
2003). What is meant by the value “freedom,” for example, can only be determined 
by the context it is used in. That is why case studies are popular in the field. Often 
an explorative and inductive research strategy is chosen (Eisenhardt 1989), which 
is fitting when little is known about the phenomenon or when the phenomenon is 
so complex that the variables and their interrelationships are hard to define. Both 
of these considerations apply in much of the research in administrative ethics. Case 
studies offer the advantage of the rich detail of actual situations and their contextu-
ality. Nonetheless, most are about only one case (e.g., Frederickson and Newman 
2000). The question that remains is whether the conclusions can be generalized to 
a larger population.
Most of the published empirical research in the field consists of studies based 
on surveys. While surveys (especially with large, random samples) have the clear 
advantage of offering a basis for generalizing about populations, they also have 
well-known disadvantages. One is that the context of the researched phenomenon is 
lost. This is especially problematic in administrative ethics because the researched 
concepts are socially constructed and often heavily debated—concepts like “public 
ethos” or, even more problematic, “values.” What are values? Where can we find 
them? Values are “essentially contested concepts”: The proper use of these concepts 
and of concrete values (such as honesty) is never agreed upon (de Graaf 2003). The 
best that can be said is that values never come just by themselves; they are never 
unaccompanied. Values are always attached to a value manifestation. In other words, 
the meaning of these concepts depends entirely on the context in which they are used. 
The contextuality of values demands that quantitative methods for studying values 
introduce validity threats: It is hard to know, for instance, whether employees who 
speak about the same value mean the same value (cf. van der Wal et al. 2006).
Context is of the utmost importance 
for much of the research in 
administrative ethics.
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Another example of the specific drawbacks of quantitative studies in the field is 
the research on whistle-blowing. Much of the correlation and regression research on 
whistle-blowing studies it outside its own unique context. In a sense, the reporting 
agent “disappears” along with the violation that is reported. This leads to the study 
of factors or variables that are certainly relevant to an understanding of whistle-
blowing, but it draws attention away from the act of reporting and the reporter. 
Quantitative research does not tell the whole story about the decision process of 
the reporter; it necessarily ignores the characteristics and details of the context of 
each case. Quantitative work cannot account for contingency, which is so important 
for social research—especially in the contingent reporting cases—because of the 
complexity of the phenomenon. It also says little about the reasons for reporting. 
Most research shows, for example, that there is a correlation between group size 
and whistle-blowing (Miceli and Near 1988; Miceli, Dozier, and Near 1991), but 
causality cannot be derived from this finding because correlations do not provide 
causal links.
Before discussing whether Q can help with the identified weaker points of qualita-
tive and quantitative studies, it must be clear what Q is and what its characteristics 
are.
what is Q Methodology?
Q methodology provides a foundation for the systematic study of subjectivity—a 
person’s viewpoint, opinion, beliefs, attitudes, and the like (Brown 1993). It was 
introduced by William Stephenson in 1935 when he announced his inversion of the 
use of intercorrelations so that individuals were measuring themselves rather than 
being measured by a researcher (Smith 2000). Stephenson distinguished his method 
from R methodology (hence the name “Q methodology”), which provided (and pro-
vides) the basis for a science of objectivity in psychology (Brown 1986). “The letter 
R in R methodology is a generalization of Pearson’s product moment r, which has 
most often been used in the study of relationships among objective characteristics 
such as traits, attributes, abilities, and so forth” (Brown 1986, 57). In contrast to R 
methodology, Stephenson correlated people rather than test items.
In a Q study, people are typically presented with a sample of statements about 
some topic (e.g., the loyalty of administrators) known as the Q set. Respondents, 
or the P set, are asked to rank-order the statements from their individual points of 
view according to some preference, judgment, or feeling about them, mostly using 
a quasi-normal distribution. By this process of Q sorting, people give their subjec-
tive meaning to the statements, and in doing so reveal their subjective viewpoints 
(Smith 2001) or personal profiles (Brouwer 1999).
The individual rankings (or viewpoints) are subjected to factor analysis. If each 
individual had specific likes and dislikes, Stephenson (1935) argued, the profiles of 
the respondents would not correlate; if, however, significant clusters of correlations 
existed, they could be factorized and described as common viewpoints (or tastes, 
preferences, dominant accounts, typologies, etc.), and individuals could be measured 
with respect to them. Brouwer argued that one of the important advantages of Q is that 
questions pertaining to one and the same domain are not analyzed as separate items 
of information but rather in their mutual coherence for the respondent: “Subjective 
feelings and opinions are most fruitfully studied when respondents are encouraged 
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to order a good sample of items from one and the same domain of subjective interest 
(instead of just replying to single questions)” (1999, 35).
The results of a Q methodological study can be used to describe a population of 
viewpoints (Risdon et al. 2003). The factors resulting from Q analysis thus repre-
sent operant clusters of subjectivity; that is to say, they represent distinctions that 
are functional (as seen by the subject) rather than merely logical (as seen by the 
researcher) (Brown 2002, 1993). “Studies using surveys and questionnaires often 
use categories that the investigator imposes on the responses. Q, on the other hand, 
determines categories that are operant” (Smith 2001, 324).
Interested readers will find more information on the methodological background of 
Q in Stephenson (1953) and Brown (1980, 1986), a guide for Q technique in Brown 
(1980, 1986, 1993), and a recent discussion and review of applications in Smith 
(2001).1 The Appendix provides a basic introduction to Q methodology, largely based 
on Brown (1980, 1993), that discusses the five steps in a Q methodological study: 
(1) definition of the concourse, (2) development of the Q sample, (3) selection of 
the P set, (4) Q sorting, and (5) analysis and interpretation. 
Q and administrative ethics
Surveys generally claim to make objective measurements of some construct for-
mulated about a population and assume that the differences are only quantitative 
(Smith 2001). Stephenson (1935, 18–19) presented Q methodology as an inversion 
of conventional factor analysis in the sense that Q correlates persons instead of tests. 
“Whereas previously a large number of people were given a small number of tests, 
now we give a small number of people a large number of test-items.” These test-items 
are always related to each other; therefore they are always within a context, and 
context is vital to administrative ethical research. Q can be very helpful in exploring 
tastes, preferences, sentiments, motives, and goals—the parts of personality that have 
great influence on behavior but often remain unexplored. Where single case studies 
have problems with generalizations, Q offers the opportunity to generalize clusters 
of viewpoints within a given population, clusters of subjectivity that are operant.
The field of administrative ethics is a broad area of study.  Lawton and Doig dis-
tinguish six themes within it: (1) the public service ethos, (2) regulation of conduct, 
(3) trust, (4) individual behavior, (5) professionals, and (6) context. “These themes 
are enduring because individual, organizational and societal values continue to 
rub against each other” (2006, 21). Interestingly enough, empirical research ques-
tions in all six themes lend themselves to a Q methodological study. After all, as 
is now  clear, Q methodology is well suited for studying empirical questions about 
the different views or standpoints that exist in any population. And these types of 
questions are asked in every one of the themes distinguished by Lawton and Doig 
(2006). Here are just a few examples of questions within these themes for which Q 
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•	 Where	does	the	loyalty	of	public	officials	lie?
•	 What	different	ethical	climates	are	perceived	in	a	police	organization,	and	
does this perception depend on the officer’s rank in the hierarchy?
As previous research using Q has shown (e.g., de Graaf 2005; Selden, Brewer, 
and Brudney 1999; van Eeten 2001), answering questions such as these with the 
help of Q methodology leads to empirically based theory (categories). And “theory 
based upon empirical evidence” is exactly what Lawton and Doig (2006, 28) call 
for in the field of administrative ethics. Q methodology gives the investigator the 
opportunity to examine and build theory without predeveloped categories. Indeed, 
it gives the investigator the opposite—an opportunity to construct categories based 
on information received only from the researched population.
Beyond looking for the mainstream viewpoints, it is the duty of academicians to 
also seek the marginalized viewpoints. Many surveys, however, conceal marginalized 
viewpoints (Dryzek 2005) because they “can be washed out in averages as across 
gender, party identification, and all manner of demographic categories, whose status 
is structural rather than functional” (Brown 2006, 374). Another interesting feature 
of Q methodology with advantages for administrative ethics is its “built-in features 
that, while not providing guarantees, certainly load the dice in favor of seeing things 
from the native’s or any other point of view, marginalized or otherwise” (Brown 
2006, 365). The elements of the P sample, once they have been Q sorted, reveal the 
inherent structure of a community’s viewpoints and of the functional groups that 
contribute to it; marginalized viewpoints are revealed on the same level as mainstream 
viewpoints (Brown 2006, 374). This means that Q methodology can be used for 
empowerment (Brown 2006, 377), especially in the areas of race (Hunter and Davis 
1992) and gender (Kitzinger 1999; Snelling 1999). For example, when the loyalty 
of administrators is studied with Q, a minority viewpoint may become apparent.
An examination of two concrete research questions in administrative ethics will 
show how Q methodology can contribute to the field by revealing what is not revealed 
by other methodologies. The first question concerns how public administrators 
reconcile competing values in their daily work. One could answer this question by 
studying a few administrators closely (interviews or observation) using a multiple-
case study design. Based on such an approach, one could draw conclusions and 
build theory, but it would not be possible to derive generalizations, because there 
are only a few cases.
If the survey were conducted with 500 randomly chosen administrators, ask-
ing them about their values and how they deal with competing values, the results 
would be generalizable. One would then able to derive how managers with differ-
ent personal or contextual characteristics deal with competing values, but it would 
still not be possible to cluster the managers according to the way they reconcile 
competing values. This is exactly why Selden, Brewer, and Brudney (1999) did a Q 
methodological study to examine the role conceptions of public administrators and 
to ascertain how competing values are reconciled within each role. They found that 
the officials described five different roles, five different ways of reconciling compet-
ing values: steward of the public interest, adapted realist, businesslike utilitarian, 
resigned custodian, and practical idealist (Selden et al. 1999, 184).
Another example would be research on the differences in values between the 
public and private sectors. A qualitative approach could be chosen in which a limited 
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number of sector-switchers are interviewed and asked about their experiences, as in 
the study by de Graaf and van der Wal (2008). Although this study gave considerable 
attention to the context of the respondents, the conclusions are not easily generaliz-
able because only sixty people were interviewed. Another approach would be to 
conduct a large survey of public and private sector managers and measure which 
values they deem most important in their decision-making (e.g., van der Wal, de 
Graaf, and Lasthuizen 2008). Differences between the sectors are then expressed in 
averages; for example, “contrary to the private sector, lawfulness, incorruptibility 
and impartiality are the most important public sector values.” In other words, an 
overall picture of the value differences emerges from the survey. It would also be 
possible, of course, to cluster the data of the survey, but in that case the test-items 
of the research would be clustered. The result would be clusters of statements that 
were valued similarly by the respondents. In a Q study, on the other hand, the factor 
analysis would be conducted over the respondents, and the results would be clusters 
of respondents who think similarly about the statements; in other words, different 
types of administrators could be distinguished based on what they consider the most 
important values in the decisions they make.
Q Methodology and discourse analysis
Thus far Q methodology has not been discussed in relation to epistemologies and 
ontologies, which usually indicates the assumption, explicit or implicit, of a positivist 
research tradition. However, Q can certainly be combined with (variants) of post-
positivistic research, such as discourse theory. For example, the political scientist 
Dryzek (1990, 187) names Q methodology as a method to describe discourses. 
Examples of successful discourse analyses using Q methodology include work by 
van Eeten (1998), Dryzek and Berejikian (1993), and Thomas, McCoy, and McBride 
(1993). “Q study will generally prove a genuine representation of that discourse as 
it exists within a larger population of persons. . . . To put it another way, our units 
of analysis, when it comes to generalizations, are not individuals, but discourses” 
(Dryzek and Berejikian 1993, 52). It is worth stating once again that the researcher 
does not use predeveloped categories in examining the discourses. This gives in-
vestigators the opportunity to reconstruct the discourses in their own words, using 
only the words spoken by individuals in the discourse.
One methodological problem for discourse analysis is deciding which of the texts 
found within an organization are important and which are not—Putnam and Fairhurst 
(2001) call this the major question of sampling. Q methodology deals with it in an 
interesting and advantageous way: Instead of simply sampling all available texts, Q 
makes certain that those aspects most important in a discourse come to the fore.
The combination of some form of discourse theory and Q methodology is well 
suited to studies of the framing of ethical questions. There have been very few em-
pirical studies on the framing of moral questions in administrative ethics (Lawton 
and Doig 2006; Menzel 2005), but the subject is important, because officials frame 
such questions on a daily basis. The fact that a moral question arises at a certain 
place and time is as interesting as what the question is, as is the fact that many moral 
questions are not asked. Every question asked receives an answer of some kind that 
has consequences.
One way to study the framing of moral questions is to study the discourses 
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of public officials. See, for example, Lawton’s contribution to this symposium. 
Discourses necessarily contain both facts and values (e.g., Foucault 1980; Hajer 
1995). Moral elements and factual statements are 
inextricably joined within a discourse (de Graaf 
2006). How one looks at the world and how one 
perceives facts necessarily determine how one 
values. The “is” and “ought” influence each other 
in countless ways. In daily conversations, norma-
tive and factual statements are intertwined; people often do not realize how much 
their views of facts determine whether they see problems in the first place. But when 
discussions are studied more carefully, it can be seen that the “is” and “ought” are 
intertwined. Specific discourses raise different moral questions. Once managers of 
soccer clubs begin to talk about soccer as a “product,” a relatively recent development 
in Europe, a new world opens up around the same old game with new opportunities, 
managerial problems, and moral issues (Hawkes 1998). Discourse analyses with Q 
methodology do not simply help us to understand that a certain moral question is 
asked; they also give the context wherein the moral problems lie and therefore their 
spectrum of possible solutions—what is or is not seen as a viable solution to a spe-
cific moral problem. As Hajer (1995, 54) observes: “Discourse analysis investigates 
the boundaries between . . . the moral and the efficient, or how a particular framing 
of the discussion makes certain elements appear fixed or appropriate while other 
elements appear problematic.” A problem definition inevitably predisposes certain 
solutions, and vice versa. Schön and Rein argue that:
When participants . . . name and frame the . . . situation in different ways, it is often 
difficult to discover what they are fighting about. Someone cannot simply say, for ex-
ample, “Let us compare different perspectives for dealing with poverty,” because each 
framing of the issue of poverty is likely to select and name different features of the 
problematic situation. We are no longer able to say that we are comparing different 
perspectives on “the same problem,” because the problem itself has changed. (1994, 
153)
Asking a moral question assumes that one knows what would constitute an answer 
to it. A discourse analysis with Q methodology can identify the rules and resources 
that set the boundaries of what can be said, thought, and done in a particular context or 
situation, what Foucault (1980) called “the conditions of possibility” of a discourse. 
“Thus, if we are to comprehend how decisions are made . . . it is by examining the 
conditions of possibility in relation to which these statements are formulated, that 
is, the often implicit institutionalized speech practices that guide what is and what 
is not likely to be said” (Mauws 2000, 235).
All in all, interesting opportunities in administrative ethics exist in which Q 
methodology can be combined with discourse theory. The method is not restricted 
to positivistic research traditions.
what Q cannot do
Like any other approach, Q has its drawbacks. Although more and more Q stud-
ies are administered via mail and the Internet, most Q sorting still takes place in 
an interview setting. And interviews, with their planning and traveling, take time. 
One way to study the framing of 
moral questions is to study the 
discourses of public officials.
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Generating statements can also be time-consuming, especially when they are derived 
from interviews, as is often the case.
Q methodology also has the rather obvious disadvantage that it is designed to 
study subjectivities and thus is not suited to study matters of fact. This means that 
it cannot be used for many interesting research questions that ask for matters of 
fact to be measured.
Another problem often mentioned is that different investigators use different 
structures to compose their Q sets (see the Appendix), leading to differing Q sets 
from the same set of possible statements (the concourse). Many Q methodologists, 
however, do not regard this as a concern for two reasons. First, the structure chosen 
is only a logical construct used by the investigator; whatever the starting point, the 
aim is always to arrive at a Q set that is representative of the wide range of exist-
ing opinions about the topic. Second, irrespective of the structure and of what the 
researcher considers a balanced set of statements, it is the subject that eventually 
gives meaning to the statements by sorting them (Brown 1993). The limited number 
of comparative studies that have been carried out indicate that different sets of state-
ments structured in different ways can nevertheless be expected to converge on the 
same conclusions (Thomas and Baas 1992).
Furthermore, because Q is a small-sample investigation of human subjectiv-
ity based on sorting items of unknown reliability, results from Q methodological 
studies have been criticized for their reliability (Thomas and Baas 1992).2 The 
most important type of reliability for Q is replicability: Will the same condition 
of instruction lead to factors that are schematically reliable (i.e., represent similar 
viewpoints on the topic) across similarly structured but different Q samples when 
administered to different sets of persons? According to Brown (1980), an important 
notion behind Q methodology is that only a limited number of distinct viewpoints 
exists on any topic. Any well-structured Q sample containing the wide range of 
existing opinions on the topic will reveal these perspectives.3 Based on the findings 
of two pairs of tandem studies, Thomas and Baas (1992) concluded that skepticism 
about this type of reliability is unwarranted. The more common notion of statistical 
reliability regarding the ability to generalize sample results to the general popula-
tion is of less concern here. As a small-sample methodology, Q is not well suited to 
cross-sectional or large-sample purposes: “administering Q-sorts is a clumsy way 
to count noses” (Brown 2002, 18). This holds true as well for any relations between 
factors and the characteristics of the people loading on these factors. From a purely 
statistical standpoint they are nonsignificant, although salient relations have been 
used as hypotheses for further research.
The procedure of a forced distribution has, according to some, the disadvantage 
of being an artificial procedure (Polit and Hungler 1999). Such a distribution is seen 
as unnatural, or as violating the independence assumption. It can be argued that this 
tends to exclude information concerning how people would ordinarily distribute their 
opinions, but studies comparing forced versus unforced distributions have shown 
that this has no bearing on the qualitative and statistical results (Block 1957; Brown 
1971). “People can ‘tell a story’ only if they have the appropriate statements with 
which to tell it. Thus, the start of a Q study involves a careful and methodologi-
cal review of the things people write and say about the topic in question” (Cross 
2005, 212). In addition, there is a risk of bias at the interpretation stage. “To take 
the analysis beyond the most basic descriptive and counting exercise requires the 
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researchers’ analytical skills in moving toward hypotheses or propositions about 
the data” (Cross 2005, 211).
Finally, an often-heard criticism concerns the fact that there is no clear guidance 
to the number of factors that should be chosen as the final solution of the analysis of 
the Q sorts, and therefore that the results of a Q study are sensitive to the researcher’s 
personal opinions, expertise, and technical skill. Academic publications using Q 
methodology only infrequently present and compare alternative factor solutions, 
thereby making it impossible for outsiders to assess whether the presented solutions 
and research results are the most appropriate. This is valid and important criticism, 
albeit again not unique to Q methodology.
Summarizing, the main problems with Q methodology have to do with reliability 
and generalizibility. It is important to remember that this technique measures the 
existence of subjectivities within a population, and not the exact distribution of 
clusters of opinion.
conclusion
What is the potential for Q methodology in administrative ethical research and 
organizational and policy guidance? This question has been answered herein by 
way of an examination of the many possibilities for Q methodological studies in the 
field. Q clearly offers a procedure and conceptual framework well suited to studying 
subjectivity in the social context.
Although only touched upon in the discussion of marginalized viewpoints, the 
promise of Q methodology is greater than just describing subjectivity: It also of-
fers new opportunities for prescription. After all, descriptions have consequences. 
By describing the different moral dimensions of their discourses, managers can, 
for instance, become more aware of the problems they and their colleagues see. In 
a sense, describing different viewpoints can be therapeutic. Viewpoint (discourse) 
descriptions can make parties more aware of their stances, factual and valuational. 
This might change how they talk and weigh their options. Awareness of differ-
ent discourses leads to a different view of self-discourse. This kind of plurality is 
important4—as long as the other viewpoints make sense, of course, which might 
not be the case when the other viewpoints are theoretically constructed. And this 
is precisely one of Q’s strongest points: It gives the investigator, whether an aca-
demician or a practitioner, the opportunity to examine and build theory without 
predeveloped categories.
notes
1. Various documents and manuscripts are available from the QArchive at the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin (www.uww.edu/personal/fac/cottlec/QArchive/qindex.htm) and from 
Peter Schmolck’s QMethod page (www.rz.unibw-muenchen.de/~p41bsmk/qmethod). 
We also recommend the Web site of the International Society for the Scientific Study of 
Subjectivity (www.qmethod.org/).
2. Because there is no external criterion for a person’s point of view, the issue of 
the validity of Q sorts does not apply (Brown 1980).
3. The test-retest reliability of Q sorts has been demonstrated to range upwards 
from 0.80 (Brown 1980).
4. Bauman (1991) noted this too when discussing the Milgram studies. The subjects 
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were inclined to do what a “scientist” in a white coat asked of them, even if that was 
against their moral feelings. But as soon as there were two “scientists” in white coats 
with opposing views and instructions, the subjects were no longer prepared to follow 
instructions to physically hurt other people. The first thing a totalitarian regime usually 
tries to do is silence opposing points of view: to not allow people moral choices or op-
posing moral points of view (discourses).
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appendix: How does Q Methodology work?
Performing a Q methodological study involves the following steps: (1) definition 
of the concourse, (2) development of the Q sample, (3) selection of the P set, (4) Q 
sorting, and (5) analysis and interpretation. Discussion of each step follows.
Definition of the Concourse
In Q, the concourse refers to “the flow of communicability surrounding any topic” 
in “the very stuff of life, from the playful banter of lovers or chums to the heady 
discussions of philosophers and scientists to the private thoughts found in dreams and 
diaries” (Brown 1993, 95). Concourse is a technical concept (not to be confused with 
discourse) for the collection of all the possible statements the respondents can make 
about the subject at hand. The concourse is thus supposed to contain all the relevant 
aspects of all the discourses. It is for the researcher to draw a representative sample 
from the concourse at hand. The concourse may consist of self-referent statements 
(i.e., opinions rather than facts), objects, pictures, and so on. A verbal concourse 
may be obtained in a number of ways: interviews, participant observation, popular 
literature (media reports, newspapers, magazines, novels), and scientific literature 
(articles, essays, books). The gathered material represents existing opinions and 
arguments, i.e., what laypeople, politicians, representative organizations, profes-
sionals, and scientists have to say about the topic; this is the raw material for a Q. 
Although any source may be used (and many have been), “the level of the discourse 
dictates the sophistication of the concourse” (Brown 1993, 95).
Development of the Q Set
A subset of statements is drawn from the concourse and subsequently presented to 
the participants. This Q set (or Q sample) often consists of forty to fifty statements, 
but it can contain fewer than forty or more than fifty (e.g., van Eeten 1998). Ac-
cording to Brown (1980, 186), the selection of statements for inclusion in the Q set 
is of crucial importance, but remains “more an art than a science”: The researcher 
uses a structure for selection of a representative miniature of the concourse. Such a 
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structure may emerge from further examination of the statements in the concourse 
or may be imposed on the concourse based on some theory. Whatever structure is 
used, it forces the investigator to select statements widely different from one an-
other in order to make the Q set broadly representative (Brown 1980). Finally, the 
statements are edited where necessary, randomly assigned a number, and printed 
on separate cards, the Q deck, for Q sorting.
Selection of the P Set
As discussed, a Q study requires only a limited number of respondents: “All that is 
required are enough subjects to establish the existence of a factor for purposes of 
comparing one factor with another. . . . P sets, as in the case of Q samples, provide 
breadth and comprehensiveness so as to maximize confidence that the major factors 
at issue have been manifested using a particular set of persons and a particular set of 
Q statements” (Brown 1980, 192–194). The P set is usually smaller than the Q set 
(Brouwer 1999). The aim is to have four or five persons defining each anticipated 
viewpoint, which often number two to four, rarely more than six. The P set is not 
random. It is a structured sample of respondents who are theoretically relevant to 
the problem under consideration—for instance, persons who are expected to have a 
clear and distinct viewpoint regarding the problem and, in that quality, may define 
a factor (Brown 1980). Eventually, the number of persons associated with a factor 
is of less importance than who they are; in the total population the prevalence may 
be much higher (Brown 1978).
Q Sorting
The general procedure is as follows (Brown 1993): The Q set is given to the respon-
dent in the form of a pack of randomly numbered cards, each card containing one 
of the statements from the Q set. The respondent is instructed to rank the statements 
according to some rule—the condition of instruction, typically the person’s point 
of view regarding the issue—and is provided with a score sheet and a suggested 
distribution for the Q sorting task. The score sheet is a continuum ranging from most 
to most (“most disagree” on one end and “most agree” on the other, for instance),5 
which form the endpoints of a distribution that usually takes the form of a quasi-
normal distribution. The kurtosis (i.e., the state of flatness or peakedness of the 
curve) of this distribution depends on the controversiality of the topic.
In case the involvement, interest, or knowledge of the respondents is expected 
to be low, or relatively few statements are expected to be salient, the distribution 
should be steeper to leave more room for ambiguity, indecisiveness, or error in 
the middle of the distribution. In case respondents are expected to have strong or 
well-articulated opinions on the topic at issue, the distribution should be flatter to 
provide more room for strong (dis)agreement with statements. Usually, respondents 
are requested to adhere to the distribution provided.6 The range of the distribution 
depends on the number of statements and its kurtosis. According to Brown (1980), 
most of today’s Q sets contain forty to fifty statements and employ a relatively flat-
tened distribution with a range of –5 to +5.
Respondents are asked to read through all of the statements carefully to gain an 
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impression of the type and range of opinions at issue. They are instructed to begin 
with a rough sorting while reading by dividing the statements into three piles: gener-
ally agree (or like, find important, etc.), generally disagree, and neutral, doubtful, or 
undecided. The number of statements in each pile is recorded to check for agreement-
disagreement balance in the Q set. Next, participants are asked to rank-order the 
statements according to the condition of instruction and to place them in the provided 
score sheet. It is generally recommended to follow the Q sort with an interview in 
which the sorters are invited to elaborate on their points of view, especially on the 
most salient statements, those placed at the extreme ends of the continuum. This 
information is helpful for the interpretation of factors later on.
Many feel that because the sorting procedure is complex and unfamiliar to the 
lay public, it requires administration in an interview setting. Van Tubergen and Olins 
(1979), however, argue that Q studies may just as well be conducted by mail. They 
found results from Q sort self-administration to be highly congruent with those from 
face-to-face settings. Reber, Kaufman, and Cropp (2000) performed two validation 
studies comparing computer- and interview-based Q sorts and concluded that there 
is no apparent difference in the reliability or validity of these two methods of ad-
ministration. Interviews, however, usually enable the researcher to understand the 
results better, and this often leads to a more penetrating interpretation. The present 
authors would mail a Q sort only if the relevant sample had a wide geographical 
distribution or administrative costs (including time) posed a hardship.
Analysis and Interpretation
Brown (1980, 1993) provides a comprehensive overview of the analysis of the Q 
sorts. Because many software packages are now available to perform the analysis, 
the overview here will be limited.7
The analysis of the sorts is a purely technical, objective procedure—and is 
therefore sometimes referred to as the scientific base of Q. First, the correlation 
matrix of all Q sorts is calculated. This represents the level of (dis)agreement be-
tween the individual sorts, that is, the degree of (dis)similarity in points of view 
between the individual sorters. The correlation matrix is then subjected to factor 
analysis to identify the number of natural groupings of Q sorts by virtue of similar-
ity or dissimilarity—that is, determining how many basically different Q sorts are 
in evidence (Brown 1993, 1980). People with similar views on the topic will share 
the same factor. A factor loading is determined for each sort, expressing the extent 
to which each Q sort is associated with each factor. The number of factors in the 
final set depends on the variability in the elicited Q sorts.8 Taking along more than 
the number of factors anticipated in the next step of the analysis (factor rotation) 
to preserve as much of the variance as possible is recommended: “Experience has 
indicated that ‘the magic number 7’ is generally suitable” (Brown 1980, 223).
This original set of factors is then rotated to arrive at a final set of factors. Rota-
tion may be either objective, according to some statistical principle (like varimax), 
or theoretical (or judgmental), driven by theoretical concerns, some prior knowledge 
or preconceived idea of the investigator; or an idea that came up during the study 
(e.g., from a salient Q sort or during a follow-up interview).9 By rotating the fac-
tors, the investigator muddles about the sphere of opinions and examines it from 
different angles. A judgmental rotation looks for confirmation of an idea or a theory, 
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a theoretical rotation for an acceptable vantage point by statistical criteria (though 
the investigator has to judge the acceptability of this solution). Rotation does not 
affect the consistency in sentiment throughout individual Q sorts or the relationships 
between Q sorts, it only shifts the perspective from which they are observed. Each 
resulting final factor represents a group of individual points of view that are highly 
correlated with each other and uncorrelated with others.10
The final step before the factors are described and interpreted is the calculation 
of factor scores and difference scores. A statement’s factor score is the normalized 
weighted average statement score (Z-score) of the respondents that defined that 
factor.11 Based on their Z-scores, statements can be attributed to the original quasi-
normal distribution, resulting in a composite (or idealized) Q sort for each factor. 
The composite Q sort of a factor represents how a hypotheti cal respondent with a 
100 percent loading on that factor would have ordered all the statements of the Q 
set. When the factors are computed, one looks back at the Q sorts to see how high 
their loadings are on the different factors. If a respondent’s factor loading exceeds 
a certain limit (usually p < 0.01), it is called a defining variate (or variable).12 The 
difference score is the magnitude of difference between a statement’s score on any 
two factors that is required for it to be statistically significant.13 When a statement’s 
score on two factors exceeds this difference score, it is called a distinguishing (or 
distinctive) statement.14 A statement that is not distinguishing between any of the 
identified factors is called a consensus statement.
Factor scores on a factor’s composite Q sort and difference scores point out the 
salient statements that deserve special attention in describing and interpreting that 
factor. Usually, the statements ranked at the extreme ends of the composite sort of a 
factor, called characterizing statements, are used to produce a first description of the 
composite point of view represented by that factor. The distinguishing and consensus 
statements can be used to highlight the differences and similarities between factors. 
Finally, the explanations Q sorters gave during the follow-up interview can be help-
ful in the interpretation of the factors, in ex-post verification of the interpretation, 
and as illustration material.
This introduction to Q methodology is largely based on Brown (1993, 1980).
notes to appendix
1 Sometimes a continuum range from least to most on the same judgment item is 
used. For theoretical reasons, however, “most” to “most” (with absence of feeling in the 
middle) should be used wherever possible (Brown 1980). Alternative items that enable Q 
sorters to express their point of view next to “(dis)agree,” for instance, are “important,” 
“relevant,” “desirable,” and “attractive.” The range of the continuum must match the 
conditions of instruction provided to Q sorters.
2. This forced distribution is practical but not necessary; it hardly has any effect on 
factors emerging from the data (Brown 1980).
3. For instance, PCQ by Stricklin (www.pcqsoft.com) and PQMethod by Schmolck 
and Atkinson (freeware: www.rz.unibw-munchen.de/~p41bsmk/qmethod; WebQ is also 
here).
4. The number of factors in the final set can be anticipated by (1) the number of 
original factors with at least two significant loadings, or more stringent, factors of which 
the cross-product of its two highest loadings (ignoring sign), exceeds twice the standard 
error; (2) the number of original factors with an eigenvalue (i.e., the sum of the squares 
of the factor loadings) in excess of 1.00.
68 • public inteGrity  winter 2008–9
Gjalt de Graaf and Job van Exel
5. Objective rotation is based on the structure of the data and therefore referred to 
as an objective or rational procedure. Theoretical (or judgmental) rotation gives more 
room to the aims and subjectivity of the investigator, who is nevertheless constrained by 
the structures that emerge from the data.
6. Secondary statistics include (1) factor eigenvalue, (2) percentage of total variance 
of the correlation matrix, and (3) communality, the sum of squared factor loadings per 
respondent, representing the part of a person’s response that is associated with the factors 
(s)he has in common with the other respondents.
7. The weight w is based on the respondent’s factor loading f, and is calculated as 
w = f/(1 – f2). The weighted average statement score is then normalized (with mean of 
0.00 and standard deviation of 1.00) to remove the effect of differences in numbers of 
defining respondents per factor, and making statements’ factor scores comparable across 
factors. Statements with a Z-score larger than 1 (or smaller than –1) are referred to as 
characterizing for that factor.
8. The limit for statistical significance of a factor loading is calculated as the mul-
tiplier for the desired level of statistical significance divided by the square root of the 
number of statements in the Q set (multipliers: 3.29 for p < 0.001; 2.58 for p < 0.01; 
1.96 for p < 0.05).
9. The difference score is based on the standard error of the factor scores (SE) and a mul-
tiplier for the required level of statistical significance. See Brown (1980) for full detail.
10. Although a statement may be distinctive between two factors, usually a state-
ment will be printed out as distinguishing only if it distinguishes one factor from all the 
other factors.
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